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. Facts
On Sunday, August 26,2001, eighty-eight-year-old Ruth Phillips ("Phillips")
did not attend church or answer her telephone. Her son, Richard Phillips,
became concerned and went to her apartment, where she lived alone, to check
on her. Upon arrival, he found his mother dead and disrobed. The autopsy
indicated that Phillips died by asphyxiation and that she may have been raped.
Subsequently, the police investigation of the apartment uncovered a white square
paper in a wallet bearing a fingerprint identical to the fingerprint of the defen-
dant, Jerzy Terrell Jackson ("Jackson"). The police also found three pubic hairs
on Phillips's body. The mtDNA sequence data on each hair matched the
mtDNA sequence from Jackson's blood sample.'
After being taken into custody, Jackson confessed to the murder.2 Accord-
ing to his confession, he entered the apartment alone and began to rifle through
Phillips's purse in her bedroom, but he did not notice that she was lying on the
bed.' Phillips exclaimed" 'What do you want? Ill give you whatever, just get
out.' ,,4 Startled, Jackson covered Phillips with a pillow in the hope she would
pass out. While smothering Phillips,Jackson also raped her.6 After he finished,
he stole her car and sixty dollars.7
At trial, however, Jackson offered a verydifferent version of what occurred
in the apartment. He claimed that after an evening of playing basketball he met
Alex and Jasper Meekins. The two asked Jackson to participate in their plan to
burgle Phillips's apartment." Jackson acquiesed.11 Alex Meekins climbed
through a window into Phillips's apartment and let the other two in through the
front door.2 While Jackson rummaged through Phillips's purse, she awoke and
1. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 590 S E.2d 520, 524 (Va. 2004).
2. Id at 524-25.
3. Id at 524.
4. Id
5. Id
6. Id at 525.







asked the intruders what they were doing.3 Jasper Meekins then suffocated
Phillips with the pillow.14 After hearing gurgling noises, Jackson knocked Jasper
Meekins from atop Phillips and readjusted her clothing."5 Jackson claimed that
he did not relate this story to the investigators while in custody because he was
intimidated by them and worried for the safety of his family.16
The jury found Jackson guilty of two counts of capital murder.7 At the
penaltyphase of the trial, the Commonwealth introduced substantial evidence of
Jackson's prior delinquency.S The Commonwealth also produced evidence of
Jackson's unruly behavior while an inmate. 9 In mitigation, Jackson submitted
evidence of his behavioral problems and difficulties in school." The jury deter-
mined that Jackson posed a future danger to society and elected to impose a
death sentence.2' The trial judge sentenced Jackson accordingly.22 Jackson then
appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.23 Jackson argued that his conviction
must be overturned for the following reasons: (1) Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.4(B) was unconstitutional because it allowed the Commonwealth to present
normally inadmissible hearsay aggravating evidence during the penaltyphase of
the trial; (2) the trial court erroneously refused to strike three jurors for cause; (3)
the jury improperly discussed evidence before the end of the trial; and (4) the
victim's son was allowed to testify despite attending part of the trial in violation
of the court's sequestering order.24 Additionally, Jackson presented a number of




17. Id at 523; seVA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(4), (5) (Michie Supp. 2003) (including "willful,
deliberate, and premeditated" murders committed during the course ofa rape or robberyin the list
of capital murders).
18. Jadeson, 590 S.E.2d at 525. Jackson had been convicted or adjudicated delinquent for
"grand larceny, petit larceny, trespassing, drug possession, receiving stolen property, contempt of
court, identity fraud, statutory burglary, credit card theft, and obtaining money under false pre-
tenses." Id
19. Id
20. Id Jackson was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, for which he
received medication. Id Nonetheless, his difficulties continued. Id at 525-26.
21. Id at 523; sE&VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(Q (MAichie Supp. 2003) (allowing the juryto
fix the sentence at death after convicting a defendant of capital murder, if the jury finds that the
defendant posed a future danger to society. The juryalso convicted Jackson of several other non-
capital crimes. Jadesn, 590 S.E.2d at 523.
22. Jadeson 590 S.E.2d at 523.
23. Id
24. Id at 526, 527, 531, 535.
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arguments that the court had already decided in previous cases and waived
several other arguments.25
I Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.4(B) forbids the use of hearsay aggravating evidence during the sentencing
phase and is therefore constitutional.26 The court also decided that the trial court
properlydenied each of Jackson's motions to strike jurors for cause.2 ' The court
decided that the evidence that the jurors improperlydiscussed the trial before its
conclusion did not warrant further hearings or a newtrial.28 The court concluded
that Jackson was not prejudiced by the testimony from Phillips's son at the
penalty phase of the trial.29 Finally, the court conducted the statutorily required
review of Jackson's death sentence and determined the sentence was not the
result of passion orprejudice and was proportional to sentences in similar cases."
I. A ni)sis
A. The CcNtitutkniity qc Vnizma Code Sewion 19.2-264.4(B)
Jackson argued that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment on
the ground that Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B) was unconstitutional because
it contained "a relaxed evidentiary standard" for admitting aggravating evidence
during the sentencing phase of the hearing." In his argument, Jackson cited the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Ringv A nzoni 2 and A pntr v New
25. Id at 535-36. Jackson also argued that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his
confession, providing the jury with a transcript of his video taped confession, allowing the juryto
view an in life picture of the victim and autopsy photographs, permitting the Commonwealth's
attorney to demonstrate the manner of Phillips's death in court with a pillow, entering the autopsy
report into evidence, and finding the evidence sufficient to support a finding of premeditation and
intent. Id at 526, 532-35. None of these claims were successful. Id at 527, 532-535. This case
note will not discuss further these claims.
26. Id at 526; se VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie Supp. 2003) (allowing the
presentation of evidence "subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility").
27. jadson, 590 S.E.2d at 528-30.
28. Id at 532.
29. Id at 535.
30. Id at 536-37; s&eVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(A), (C) (Mchie Supp. 2003) (requiring the
Supreme Court of Virginia to review each death sentence entered by Virginia circuit courts and
ensure that they are not disproportionate to sentences entered in similar cases or the result of
passion or prejudice).
31. Jasor, 590 S.E.2d. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted); seeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-
264.4(B) (Mfichie Supp. 2003) (stating that all relevant evidence is admissible during the sentencing
phase subject to the rules of evidence).
32. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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Jersey." Appmli requires sentence enhancers to be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, and Ri4 extended that rule to include factors that enhance a
sentence to death.34 The court interpreted Jackson's citation to these cases as an
argument that section 19.2-264.4(B) was unconstitutional because it allowed a
court to impose the death penalty even if a jury did not find any aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt?
First, the court rejected the argument that section 19.2-264.4(B) failed to
comply with the Supreme Court's holdings in Ring and Almi. 3 6 The court
noted that under the statutory scheme, before a defendant may be sentenced to
death, the Commonwealth must prove one statutory aggravating factor beyond
a reasonable doubt.37 Additionally, the Code explicitlystated that, unless waived,
a jury would determine whether the Commonwealth had made that showing."
Therefore, the court determined that section 19.2-264.4(B) did not violate the
Supreme Court's mandates in Ring and Appwni because, in Virginia, the jury
must find at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt to
impose a death sentence.3
The court also found that section 19.2-264.4(B) did not contain a relaxed
evidentiarystandard for admitting aggravating evidence during the penaltyphase
of the trial. ' Rather, the court noted that the statute specifically subjected
relevant evidence during the sentencing phase" 'to the rules of evidence govern-
ing admissibility.' "41 The court found this conclusion consistent with its prior
33. Jadscn, 590 S.E.2d at 526; see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) ("Capital
defendants ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions
an increase in their maximum punishment."); Aprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492 (2000)
(finding that "any fact that increases the penty for a crime beyond the rescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable do t").
34. See Ris 536 U.S. at 589 (holding that aggravating factors that increase a sentence to
death must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury); Appei, 530 U.S. at 490 (stating that
a jury must find all conditions precedent for an enhanced sentenced beyond a reasonable doubt).
35. Seejakso, 590 S.E.2d at 526 (stating that bycitingAlpmi and Rir Jackson apparently
suggested that the Virginia statutes failed to comply with the mandates from those cases).
36. Id
37. Id; sw VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(Q (Michie Supp. 2003) (stating that the Common-
wealth must prove one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before a court may
sentence a defendant to death).
38. Jadescn, 590 S.E.2d at 526; seeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3 (Nchie Supp. 2003) (stating
that a jury shall decide whether to impose the death sentence).
39. Jadeso, 590 S.E.2d at 526.
40. Id
41. Id (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)). Jackson's argument was not as easily
dispatched as the opinion suggests. The actual text of the statute specifically directs the court to
admit all relevant evidence at the penaltyphase. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B). Next, the statute
states "[elvidence which maybe admissible, subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility,
may include the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and background of the
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holdings that irrelevant evidence, hearsay, and presentence reports from proba-
tion officers were all inadmissible during the penalty phase.4 Lastly, the court
concluded that because Jackson failed to point to anyspecific, normallyinadmis-
sible evidence admitted during the penalty phase of his trial, any concerns he
raised regarding section 19.2-264.4(B)'s relaxed evidentiarystandard were purely
hypothetical.43 Therefore, the court determined that the trial court correctly
refused to dismiss the indictments. 44
B. Jury Sdeaici
Jackson claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to strike three prospec-
tive jurors for cause during voir dire.4 The court acknowledged the defendant's
right to an impartial jury.4' Consequently, the court stated that a judge must
dismiss any partial venire members. 47 However, because the trial judge had a
greater opportunityto observe voir dire than the Supreme Court of Virginia, the
court noted that it would overturn the judge's decision onlyif the record showed
manifest error on the trial judge's part.48 In deciding whether to disturb the trial
judge's decision, the court considered the entire record of each juror's voir dire.49
defendant, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense." Id The word "other," in the final
clause of the sentence, may have been interpreted to imply that the clause subjecting evidence
presented during the sentencing phase to the rules of admissibility may only have applied to
mitigating evidence. The court implicitlyrejected this reading of the statute bydetermining that the
clause also applied to aggravating factors. In effect, the court treated the first sentence of § 19.2-
264.4(B) as surplusage. This feature of the court's opinion will be discussed further in Section IV.
42. jadescp, 590 S1E.2d at 526; se Lovitt v. Warden, 585 S.E.2d 801, 826 (Va. 2003) (stating
that hearsay evidence is not admissible at the sentencing phase of a capital trial; Remington v.
Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 620, 634-35 (Va. 2001) (finding the trial court properly excluded
irrelevant evidence during the penaltyphase proceeding and quoting the section of VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.4(B) specifically prohibiting the admission of presentence reports from probation
officers).
43. Jadeson, 590 S.E2d at 526.
44. Id
45. Id at 527.
46. Id; sw U.S. COiT. amend. VI (granting the accused the right to " animpartial jur"); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV (stating that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law"); VA. C£NST. art. I, 5 8 (stating that in Virginia, the accused "shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of his vicinage").
47. Jadesco, 590 S.E.2d at 527; swVA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-358 (fichie 2000) (providing that
"if it shall appear to the court that the juror does not stand indifferent in the cause, another shall
be drawn or called and placed in his stead for the trial of that case").
48. Jakso, 590 S.E.2d at 527 (quoting Pope v. Commonwealth, 360 S E.2d 352, 358 (Va.
1987)) (explaining that, due to the trial judge's greater opportunityto view prospective jurors during
jury selection," 'the trial court's exercise of judicial discretion in deciding challenges for cause will
not be disturbed on appeal, unless manifest error appears in the record' ").
49. Id at 527; se Vinson v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (Va. 1999) (observing that




Jackson argued that the judge erred byfailing to dismiss juror Reinsberg for
cause after she indicated that, due to a newspaper article she had read, she
"probably' would require the defense to produce evidence indicating inno-
cence.50 However, the court noted that later during her voir dire, the juror told
the Commonwealth's Attorneythat she understood that the state must prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt and that she also understood that the defendant
was under no obligation to produce evidence at either the guilt or sentencing
phase of the trial."' Moreover, the court stated that," 't]he real test is whether
jurors can disabuse their minds of their natural curiosity and decide the case on
the evidence submitted and the law as propounded in the court's instruct-
ions."' 52 Because juror Reinsberg satisfied this test, the court found that the trial
judge did not err in declining to strike her for cause.
53
2. JurBaffer
Next, Jackson claimed that juror Baffer should have been excluded because
he responded affirmativelywhen the defense counsel asked if he would automati-
cally impose the death penalty should he find the defendant posed a future
danger to society.5" The court noted that juror Baffer's entire interview during
voir dire indicated that he would not automatically impose a death sentence, but
that he would also consider a sentence of life without parole.5 Additionally, the
court reiterated that "it is improper to ask prospective jurors speculative ques-
tions regarding whether they would automatically impose the death penalty in
certain hypothetical situations without reference to a juror's ability to consider
the evidence and follow the court's instructions."56 Therefore, the court held
that the judge properly seated juror Baffer
ity").
50. jakscpn 590 SE.2d at 528.
51. Id at 528-29.
52. Id at 529 (quoting Townes v. Commonwealth, 362 S.E.2d 650, 662 (Va. 1987)).
53. Id
54. Id
55. Id at 529-30; se Viwcn 522 S.E.2d at 176 (stating that a court should examine the entire
record of voir dire when reviewing a judge's decision of whether to strike for cause).
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3. Juor Benu
Jackson also argued that the trial judge should have stricken juror Berube
for cause after she stated that she would not consider all of the mitigating factors
during the sentencing phase of the trial.5 8 However, juror Berube also stated that
she would be able to follow the trial court's instructions and consider all mitigat-
ing evidence when fixing the penalty.59 Moreover, the trial judge noted that juror
Berube "did not initially understand what mitigating factors were."6" Thus, the
court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that juror Berube was fair and
impartial.61
C JuForMisCxxda
During the course of the trial, the jurors asked the court if they could talk
about the evidence they already observed and testimony they already heard. 2
The judge and parties agreed that the jurors should not discuss such matters until
deliberation, and the judge gave the jury an instruction to that effect.63 At that
time, Jackson neither objected to those instructions nor asked for a mistrial.'
Therefore, Jackson failed to preserve any claim for appeal that the judge should
have granted a mistrial upon learning of the jury's confusion concerning what
they could discuss before the close of evidence.5
After the trial, Jackson moved for an evidentiaryhearing or a new trial based
on an affidavit from alternate juror Picataggi, in which she alleged that the jury
had improperly discussed the evidence presented at trial before deliberations.66
Although Jackson asked the judge to summon all of the jurors to the evidentiary
hearing, the judge only summoned alternate juror PicataggL She recalled one
conversation, in particular, about the defense counsel's questioning of a detective
in which the jurors decided that they did not like the attorney's manner but





62. Jadescn, 590 S.E.2d at 530.
63. Id
64. Id
65. Id at 530-31; s&VA. SUP. Cr. R. 5:25 (stating that an appellate court may not find error
in a trial court's decision unless the appealing party objected to that ruling.
66. Jades, 590 S.E.2d at 531.
67. Id; see Keams v. Hall, 91 S.E.2d 648, 653 (Va. 1956) (finding that if "allegations of the
misconduct of a jury are of such a nature as to indicate that the verdict was affected thereby, it
becomes the dutyof the court to investigate the charges and to ascertain whether or not, as a matter
of fact, the jury was guilty of such misconduct").
68. jadesc, 590 S.E.2d at 531.
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also stated that other conversations had not involved anythird persons, did not
lead to conclusions about Jackson's guilt or innocence, and were not limited to
discussions about the lawyers' demeanors during questioning.69 She admitted
that she could not remember if the conversations had occurred before or after
the trial judge ordered the jury not to discuss the events at the trial before
deliberation.' After evaluating alternate juror Picataggi's testimony, the trial
judge denied Jackson's motion for a new trial because the testimony failed to
establish probable misconduct or prejudice to Jackson."1
Jackson argued on appeal that the statements indicated a probability of
prejudice, that the assertion that the trial lawyer "got to the truth or to the
bottom of it" amounted to a decision of actual guilt or innocence, and that the
trial judge should have at least called all of the jurors to the evidentiaryhearing.72
The court found that in Virginia, juror testimony should not normally be used
to impeach the juryverdict unless the prejudicial conduct occurred outside of the
jury room and the evidence established a probability of prejudice.7 3 The court
decided that the trial court properly declined to order a mistrial or further
investigate the allegations.74 Alternate juror Picataggi's testimony did not estab-
lish a probability of prejudice because she onlyrecalled one discussion, she could
not remember anydetails about the other conversations, including whether they
occurred before or after the judge issued his instruction, and she admitted that
the conversations did not contain anyexpressions about Jackson's ultimate guilt
or innocence." The court concluded that" '[i]f gossip of [jurors] among them-
selves, or surmise, is to be the basis of new trials there would be no end to
litigation.' "76
D. Tes67nyficm dx Viaim's Son
Jackson argued that the trial court erred by permitting the victim's son to
testify during the penaltyphase of the proceedings after allowing him to remain





73. Id at 531-32; sw Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Hulvey, 353 S.E.2d 747, 750-51 (Va. 1987)
(stating that testimonyfrom jurors should not be used to impeach their own verdict unless the acts
in the testimonyoccurred outside of the juryroom); Haddad v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 17,20
(Va. 1985) (requiring the appellate court to find a "probability of prejudice" before declaring a
mistrial).
74. Jadso, 590 S.E.2d at 532.
75. Id
76. Id (quoting Margiotta v. Aycock, 174 S.E. 831, 835 (Va. 1934) (alterations in origina]).
77. Id at 535. Jackson also claimed that the son's presence in the courtroom during the trial
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The court noted that Virginia Code section 19.2-265.01 permits a victim to stay
in the courtroom during trial unless the judge decides that the victim's presence
would prejudice the accused.78 By attending the guilt phase, Phillips's son could
not have learned anything that would have changed his victim impact testimony
during the sentencing phase; consequently, the court determined that the trial
judge properly allowed him to remain at the trial subsequent to his initial testi-
mony.
E. Issues Pewds1y Ded
Jackson also argued that the circuit court erroneously denied his pretrial
motion that alleged that Virginia's capital murder statutes were unconstitutional."
Jackson claimed that the statutes were unconstitutional because: (1) byfailing to
provide meaningful guidance to the jury, the aggravating factor future dangerous-
ness was unconstitutionally vague and thereby caused arbitrary and capricious
applications of the death penalty;, (2) the statutes did not provide for adequate
instruction to the jury concerning mitigating evidence; (3) the statutes permitted
the introduction of unadjudicated prior conduct and therefore produced unreli-
able determinations; (4) the statutes allowed a trial court to consider hearsay
evidence found in a post-sentence report; (5) the statutes did not permit a trial
court to set aside a death penalty on a showing of good cause; (6) the statutes did
"not provide for meaningful appellate review"; and (7) the statutes required
expedited appellate review."1 The court noted that it had previouslyrejected each
of these arguments and found each prior rejection proper.
82
F. Issues Wawd
At oral argument Jackson withdrew his claims that the trial judge "erred in
denying defendant's motion to dismiss capital murder indictment for failure to
had an improper influence on the jury, but the court did not respond to this argument. Id
78. Id; seeV. CODE ANN. § 19.2-265.01 (Michie 2000) (stating that a victim "may remain
in the courtroom and shall not be excluded unless the court determines, in its discretion, the
presence of the victim would impair the conduct of a fair trial").
79. Jadkson, 590 S.E.2d at 535.
80. Id
81. Id at 535-36.
82. Id;seeBellv. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695,716 (Va. 2002) (noting that the court had
already decided that the future dangerousness requirement was not unconstitutionally vague, the
introduction of unadjudicated criminal conduct during sentencing did not lead to unreliable results,
the trial court's use of a post-sentence report that contained hearsaywas not unconstitutional, and
the appellate review specified by the statutes was not unconstitutional); Lovitt v. Commonwealth,
537 S.E.2d 866, 874 (Va. 2000) (stating that the court had already found Virginia's juryinstructions
on mitigatin evidence constitutionaD; Chandler v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219, 223 (Va. 1995)
(Allowing, but not requiring, a trial judge to reduce a sentence of death to life imprisonment on
a showing of 'good cause' is not unconstitutional.").
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allege aggravating elements" and that the trial judge erred in denying his motion
for change of venue."3 Therefore, the court did not consider those arguments."
Jackson also failed to brief his claim that the district court erred bypermitting the
Commonwealth to argue matters during the penaltyphase not previously intro-




1. Passion and ljudice
Virginia Code section 17.1-313(q(1) requires the Supreme Court of Virginia
to conduct an automatic review of each death sentence to determine if it was the
result of "passion, prejudice or anyother arbitraryfactor."17 Jackson argued that
because the trial judge failed to grant his motion for a change of venue and to
strike three jurors for cause, the verdict was a result of passion or prejudice.8
The court noted that it had already found the three jurors properly seated and
that Jackson had waived his claim that the trial judge's failure to grant a change
of venue impacted the result of his trial.89 Nonetheless, the court examined
whether those issues, or anything else, mayhave caused the verdict to be a result
of passion or prejudice and upheld the verdict.'
2. PmotimltyRedew
Similarly, Virginia Code section 17.1-313(C)(2) requires the Supreme Court
of Virginia to review each death sentence to determine if it "is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant."9 Therefore, the court looked at all similar capital
cases to determine whether Jackson's sentence was proportionate to the sen-
tences imposed in those cases. 2 The court found that Beawn u UCwnu1dig'3
provided a useful comparison to Jackson's case. " In that case, the defendant was
83. Jadeson, 590 S.E.2d at 536.
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id; see Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 576 SE.2d 471, 479 (Va. 2003) (stating that, in accord
with long-standing precedent, arguments not briefed will be deemed waived).
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(q() (Michie 2003).
88. Jadson, 590 S.E.2d at 536.
89. Id at 536-37.
90. Id at 537.
91. VA. CODE ANN. 5 17.1-313(Q(2).
92. Jadeson, 590 S.E.2d at 537.
93. 427 S.E.2d 411 (Va. 1993).
94. Jadeson, 590 S.E.2d at 537; seeBeavers v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 411, 414-15, 423
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sentenced to death for raping an elderly woman and suffocating her with a
pillow." Given the similar circumstances and sentences between the two cases,
as well as the results from the other cases the court reviewed, the court deter-
mined that Jackson's sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate to the
penalties imposed in similar cases.96
IV. Appication
A. The C lio rityqc Vi*zi GodeSetion 19.2-264.4(B)
By deciding that Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B) was not unconstitu-
tional, the court implicitlyadopted an unusual reading of the statute.97 The actual
text of the statute contains two parts. The first section states that, during the
sentencing hearing, "evidence maybe presented as to anymatter which the court
deems relevant to sentence."98 This broad grant of admissibility implies that
evidence need only be relevant to be admitted during sentencing. However, the
second sentence restricts the first by stating that "[e]vidence which may be
admissible, subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility, mayinclude
the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and background of the
defendant, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense."" The wording of
the second sentence restricts the first by subjecting some evidence to the rules
of evidence. Its use of the word "other" modifying mitigation evidence strongly
implies that the restriction only applies to mitigating evidence and consequently
allows a court to admit relevant aggravating evidence whether or not it would
satisfy the rules of evidence governing admissibility,
Such a reading, however, would be unconstitutional under United States
Supreme Court precedent. Jackson cited Ring for the proposition that the
statutory aggravating factors are elements of the crime that must be submitted
to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."°° The court interpreted this
as an argument that the statute allowed a court to impose a death sentence on a
defendant without first submitting the aggravating factor to a jury for proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 1 The court properly noted that such an argument
(Va. 1993) (upholding the death sentence for a defendant who raped an elderly woman and
suffocated her with a pillow).
95. B&azw, 427 S.E.2d at 414-15.
96. Jadscon 590 S.E.2d at 537.
97. S& id at 526 (stating that the statute requires both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances to satisfy the rules of evidence prior to admission when the statute could be fairly read to
subject only the mitigating circumstances to those requirements).
98. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie Supp. 2003).
99. Id




is clearlyrefuted bythe actual texts of the statutes.' A more plausible argument
based on the text of section 19.2-264.4(B) and the Supreme Court's holding in
Ring would have been that the two combined allowed a court to decide an
element of a crime without the procedural safeguard of the rules of evidence in
violation of Spebt v Patemson' 03 Spebt held that a collateral proceeding that could
increase the defendant's punishment and the result of which depended on a
finding of additional facts not adduced at trial must also contain proper eviden-
tiary safeguards such as the right to confront adverse witnesses.' 4 Rather than
arguing that the Virginia statute allowed an aggravating factor to not be found by
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson likely argued that it permitted the
court to find an element of the crime without the necessary evidentiary proce-
dural safeguards. The court avoided this argument by finding that the second
sentence of the statute actuallyapplied to aggravating factors as well as mitigating
factors.' Therefore, section 19.2-264.4(B) should be read to subject aggravating
factors, as well as mitigating factors, to the rules of evidence governing admissi-
bility."
B. Voi Dim
The court's holding also provides an important insight into the best manner
to conduct voir dire. The court declined to find that the trial judge erroneously
refused to strike a juror despite the juror's assertion that he would automatically
impose the death penalty."7 The court reasoned that the attorney improperly
inquired about whether the juror would automatically vote for the death penalty
in a hypothetical situation without also inquiring about whether the juror could
follow the court's instructions.' Therefore, practitioners should be careful to
reference a juror's capacityto followinstructions when asking whether she would
automatically impose the death penalty. Otherwise, an impartial juror may be
seated over defense counsel's objections, but an appellate court might not grant
relief because the juror's signs of impartialityresulted from an improper question.
102. Id
103. SeSpecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605,608-10 (1967) (requiring procedural safeguards for
a determination of future dangerousness mi a separate proceeding that increases the sentence for
those convicted under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act).
104. Id
105. Jadkso, 590 S.E.2d at 526.
106. For a motion to bar evidence supporting aggravating factors during the sentencing phase
for failure to meet the rules of evidence governing adfmissibility, please contact the Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse. For a complete discussion of VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) with regard to
mitigating factors, see Maxwell C Smith, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 615 (2004) (analyzing Brown
v. Luebbers, 344 F.3d 770 (8th CAr. 2003)).
107. Jadeso, 590 S.E.2d at 530.
108. Id
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C JurrMir srbct
The court also failed to clarify when, if ever, improper discussions among
the jury will form the basis for a new trial. The court quoted seventy-year-old
precedent for the proposition that" Ti]f gossip of [jurors] among themselves, or
surmise, is to be the basis of new trials there would be no end to litigation.' "109
This would indicate that the court is willing to countenance a fair amount of
discussion among the jurors. However, the court also rested its decision on the
fact that none of the discussions among the jurors addressed Jackson's guilt or
innocence."' The court relied on Haddad v C eWi aat" for this proposi-
tion.' In that case, the court found that a new trial was required when a juror
expressed a belief in the defendant's guilt to a third party."' Therefore, the court
failed to state whether a new trial would be required if a juror expressed a belief
in, or doubt of, the accused's guilt to another juror rather than a third party
before deliberation. The court's reluctance to order a new trial based on mere
"gossip" or "surmise" suggests that the court would not order a new trial.
However, the court's concern over whether the jurors discussed Jackson's
innocence implies that the court might order a new trial if the jurors broached
the subject of the accused's innocence even once.
D. A utanrzicReuew
1. Passionor Prej*Se
The court also decided that the verdict was not the result of passion or
prejudice, despite the defendant's motion to change venue.114 The court based
this holding on the "relative ease" with which the jurywas seated. 5 In support-
ing this conclusion, the court cited Thcmzs v Ccw1mad* 6 for the proposition
that" '[ t]he ease with which an impartial jury can be selected is a critical element
in determining whether the prejudice in the communitystemming from pre-trial
publicity is so wide-spread that the defendant cannot get a fair trial in that ven-
ue.' "17 As the quote suggests, Thom concerned a trial court's denial of a pre-
trial change of venue motion, not whether a death sentence was the product of
109. Id at 532 (quoting Mxobffta 174 S.E. at 835 (alteration in original).
110. Id
111. 329 SE.2d 17 (Va. 1985).
112. jadsc, 590 S.E.2d at 531-32; see Hadda 329 S.E2d at 20 (ordering a new trial when
conversations between a juror and a third party touched on the accused's guilt or innocence).
113. Hadda4 329 S.E.2d at 20.
114. jadsor, 590 S.E.2d at 537.
115. Id at 537 n.8.
116. 559 S.E.2d 652 (Va. 2002).




passion or prejudice. *"' Therefore, the relative ease with which the jury was
selected maybe at least one factor the court will consider in determining whether
a death sentence resulted from passion or prejudice as well as whether a trial
court improperly denied a request for a change of venue.
2. Pmrv*ivitReuew
The specific mechanics of Virginia's proportionality review still remain
unclear after the holding in Jakson v Camnm adth."9  In Hudson v
Qa, i , 120 decided on the same day as Jadso, the court offered a slightly
different formulation of how it conducts the proportionality review.121 In Hud-
so, the court claimed to have "accumulated the records of all capital murder
cases where a defendant received a death sentence as well as those where a
defendant received a life sentence." 12 However, the court offered no indication
of which capital murder cases were actuallyin its collection. 3 Does the collec-
tion include capital cases in which the defendant was charged with capital mur-
der, but the Commonwealth did not seek the death sentence? Does it include
cases in which the defendant was charged with capital murder, but was convicted
of first degree murder? Does it include cases in which the defendant pleaded
guilty to capital murder in exchange for a life sentence?
In Jakson, the court noted that it "consider[s] all capital murder cases
presented to this Court for review."'24 This would implythat the onlycases that
are in the court's collection are those that the court has previously considered.
Jadeson fails to clarify if these cases include capital life cases that were appealed
to the court, but which the court declined to hear. 2 ' Regardless, no matter how
many capital life cases the court has collected, the collection will still be inade-
quate for the proportionality review. The statute directs the court to consider
"both the crime and the defendant" in its proportionality review 26 However,
a defendant sentenced to a life sentence after a conviction for capital murder
cannot appeal that sentence because that sentence is the most favorable outcome
118. Thano, 559 S..2d at 659.
119. Jadesc, 590 S.E.2d at 537.
120. 590 S.E.2d 362 (Va. 2004).
121. Se Hudson v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 362, 364 (Va. 2004) (containing slightly
different wordings for a number of important aspects of proportionality review). For a complete
discussion of the court's proportionality review in Hudm, seeJessie A. Seiden, Case Note, 16 CAP.
DEF. J. 529 (2004) (analyzing Hudson v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 362 (Va. 2004)).
122. Hdior 590 S.E.2d at 364.
123. See id (declining to delineate what will constitute a capital murder case for the purposes
of the proportionality review).
124. Jadeson 590 S.E.2d at 537.
125. Id
126. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(E) (Michie 2003).
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possible from that part of the trial."' The court will not have any record of the
sentencing phase of the hearing available upon appeal, and consequently the
court's collection of capital cases will have no record of the sentencing phases of
the accumulated capital life cases. At the sentencing phase, the defendant's
character is the main issue.' Thus, the court will be unable to fulfill the man-
date of the statute and compare a given defendant's character to the character of
defendants who committed similar crimes but received life sentences because the
court will not have any record of the characters of the defendants who received
life sentences.
In Hudson, the court stated that it first "reviewed" similar capital cases and
then found that the defendant's sentence was not disproportionate to those
imposed in "comparable" cases."2 The court's analysis suggests that the court
may broadly review all of the cases in the collection of capital cases and then
compare the case before it to a selected subset of cases fromthat broader review.
In ja&smo, however, the court initially observed that it would "compare" Jack-
son's case with similar cases, but then stated that the purpose of the "review" was
to ensure uniformityin the application of Virginia's capital sentencing statutes. 131
Therefore, it is also unclear whether the court will conduct its proportionality
review in two stages, a broader review of all capital cases followed by a few
comparisons between the case at hand and particularly similar cases, or if the
court's analysis is conducted in one stage for which the court uses the words
"review" and "compare" interchangeably.
Finally, inJackson and Hdon the court noted that it would also onlycom-
pare cases concerning the same aggravating factor. However, injadksonthe court
stated it would only compare cases in which "the death penalty was imposed
based upon the future dangerousness aggravating factor," whereas in Hudonthe
court said it would compare cases in which "the Commonwealth sought the
death penalty based upon the aggravating factors of vileness and future danger-
ousness. " "' Therefore, the two cases propose somewhat different tests. Under
the Hudson rationale, the court would compare two cases in which the Common-
wealth sought the death penalty based on both aggravating factors but the jury
found different aggravating factors in each case; under the Jadeson formulation,
127. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(A) (Mlchie Supp. 2003) (stating that after a defendant
is convicted of capital murder "a proceeding shall be held which shall be limited to a determination
as to whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment").
128. Swmr4y VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (allowing the defendant to produce evidence
supporting mitigating factors for the crime, including character and history, and the Commonwealth
to produce evidence supporting aggravating factors lit the future danger defendant poses to
society and the vileness on the part of the defendant in committing the crime).
129. Hudsn 590 S.E.2d at 364.
130. jascm, 590 S.E.2d at 537.
131. Id; Hu0rv 590 S1E.2d at 364.
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the court would not. The Jadkson formulation is superior because it directs the
court to compare cases in which the jury actually found similar aggravating
circumstances and thereby creates a more precise comparison because a salient
feature of each case compared will be identical.
V. Cordain
The court's opinion in Jadeson has a number of important features. First,
the court determined that Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B) applies to aggra-
vating factors as well as mitigating factors. Second, the court found it improper
to ask a prospective juror a speculative question about whether the juror would
automatically impose the death sentence without including the juror's ability to
follow the judge's instructions in the question. Third, the court decided that the
ease with which a jurywas seated is an important factor to consider in determin-
ing whether a death sentence was the result of passion or prejudice. Finally, the
court did little to clarifythe specifics of how it conducts the statutorily required
proportionality review.
Maxwell C. Smith
